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Professions, Organizations and Institutions: 
Tenure Systems in Colleges and Universities 
Abstract 
A common strategy used by professions to suppo rt claims of workplace jurisdiction 
involves the institut ionalization of professionally-endorsed formal structures, yet both theory and 
research suggest that ensuring the implementation of institut ionalized structures after formal 
adoption can be problematic. This study investigates the influence of organizational 
characteristics on the implementation of one professionally-created institution in higher education 
organizations, tenure systems for faculty employment. Our results suggest that implementation of 
tenure systems is negatively affected by internal resource pressures, but positively affected by 
countervailing pressures from professionally-linked constituents. The results also suggest self-
limiting aspects of the use of tenure systems. 
Keywords: tenure systems, institutions, implementation, professions, colleges and universities 
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Professions, Organizations and Institutions: 
Tenure Systems in Colleges and Universities 
Sociological theories of professions have long recognized the potential conflict between 
bureaucracy and profession as systems for accomplishing work activities (Abbott, 1988; Barley, 
2004; Freidson, 2001; Hall, 1967; Scott, 1965; Tolbert, 1996; Tolbert and Stern, 1991; Wallace, 
1995). Freidson (1994) cast this in terms of two competing bases of authority, denoted as 
occupational and administrative principles. The former rests on the belief that those who possess 
specialized, occupationally-based knowledge required for the execution of central tasks in an 
organization – i.e., members of a profession – should have control over key organizational 
decisions, such as defining appropriate work processes and conditions, setting required 
qualifications for employment, and evaluating work outcomes and individual performance. The 
administrative principle, on the other hand, is predicated on the belief that authority should be tied 
to hierarchical position, which presumably reflects a different kind of specialized knowledge, one 
involving a general understanding of the requirements for ongoing organizational functioning and 
the integration of activities across different subunits. This implies that decisions about work 
procedures, hiring, performance evaluation and dismissal or retention, among others, should be 
left in the hands of those who are focused primarily on the efficient running of an organization and 
its survival. Because both principles embody rational-legal authority and thus have legitimacy in 
contemporary society, when those possessing occupational authority disagree with those 
po ssessing administrative aut hority, it is often unclear which principle should do minate. 
A common response by professions to such potential conflicts involves constructing and 
promulgating organizational institut ions – prescribed practices and formal structures that maintain 
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or enhance professional power and are to be adopted and followed by organizations that employ 
members of the profession (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Leicht & Fennell, 1997). 
Such structures typically support members’ input into organizational decision-making involving 
control of work, and are often an inherent part of professionalization projects—i.e., efforts by 
occupations to claim certain areas of economic production as the exclusive domain of their 
members (Berlant, 1975; Larson, 1977). When possible, professions rely on the coercive power 
of the state to support these efforts (Abbott, 1988), and occasionally on that of labor unions 
(Rabban, 1991), but more often, they rely on the responsiveness of work organizations to moral 
suasion and public pressure to demonstrate legitimacy by following professional prescript ions 
(Scott, 2008). Organizations that fail to conform to professionally-endorsed organizational 
arrangements may be subject to greater external scrutiny and a loss of reputation, while those that 
comply are presumed to receive a variety of benefits, such as enhanced recruiting and retention of 
professional employees (Morris & Pinnington, 1998), higher status within the profession and, 
consequently, among non-professional constituents (Whitley, 1984; Abbott, 1991; Freidson, 
2001), and generally, greater access to environmental resources required for survival (Scott, Ruef, 
Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). Thus, professions are a key source of isomorphism, or the 
widespread adoption of formal structures across a set of organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Tenure systems in higher education organizations provide a good example of a 
professionally-based institut ion. The origins of this institut ion lie directly in the self-conscious 
efforts by members of an occupation, once a subset of the clergy, to establish themselves as a 
distinct professional community in the U.S., and particularly, to assert control over organizational 
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decisions about faculty employment. Contemporary tenure systems also reflect a common issue 
for professions, ensuring that endorsed arrangements are regularly used after adoption. 
Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) early discussion of decoupling highlighted the distinction 
between adoption and implementation of institut ionalized structures; they suggested that 
organizations commonly decouple (fail to implement) such structures after their formal adoption. 
In their words (1977: 357), “…decoupling enables organizations to maintain standardized, 
legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical considerations. 
The organizations in an indus try tend to be similar in formal structure – reflecting their common 
institut ional origins – but may show much diversity in actual practice.”1 
Questions of the extent to which organizations are apt to engage in decoupling, and under 
what conditions this is most likely to occur, have been explored in only a handful of studies. Most 
of these have focused on relatively new institutional arrangements, such as total quality 
management programs (e.g., Easton & Jarrell, 1998; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997) or stock 
re-purchase programs (Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 2001). None have investigated the determinants 
of decoupling involving institut ions that are well-established in a field, nor specifically considered 
the effects of ongoing pressures by professions and allied organizations to enforce 
implementation. 
In this study we address these issues by examining the effects of organizational 
characteristics, including those indexing resource constraints and relations to professionally-linked 
resource providers, on the use of tenure systems by colleges and universities. Our central aim is 
to illuminate general conditions that affect the ability of professions to shape organizations 
(Rhoades, 1996). Since an increasing share of professional practice takes place today within the 
context of large-scale organizations, this issue is important to research on professional 
3 
occupations as well as to studies of organizations. In addition, our specific focus on the use of 
different types of faculty employment arrangements provides a unique chance to examine a 
contemporary workplace trend that is affecting many occupations, the growing use of contingent 
workers. In most occupations, this trend challenges largely unarticulated, albeit taken-for-granted 
assumpt ions that organizational employment is normally long-term and entails a full-time 
commitment (Weber, 1946; Pfeffer & Baron, 1988). In academia, however, these assumptions 
have been made explicit in a professional institution, the tenure system. Thus, our study offers a 
useful comparative case for examining whether organizational characteristics that have been 
linked to use of contingent employees in non-professional settings are also influential in this 
context. 
We begin by sketching the history of the tenure system in the U.S. to show how organized 
representatives of academic professionals effected its institut ionalization among higher education 
organizations, and how, despite the continuing presence of tenure systems in most colleges and 
universities, the implementation of this structure for faculty employment has gradually declined 
over time. We then discuss key organizational characteristics and relations that are likely to 
influence decoupling in general, leading to our empirical analysis of the determinants of the 
implementation of tenure systems by colleges and universities. In concluding, we discuss some of 
the avenues for further research that are suggested by our analysis. 
TENURE AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTION 
Institutionalizing Tenure Systems 
The establishment of tenure systems in higher education can be traced to the medieval 
universities of Europe, which drew upon emerging models of guild organizations to set up 
governance structures that afforded university members protection from unwelcome attempts by 
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monarchs and non-faculty ecclesiastical authorities to influence higher education.2 The 
contemporary form of tenure systems in the United States, however, is most directly rooted in a 
series of public pronouncements offered by the first national professional association of higher 
education faculty, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), organized in the 
early 20th century. Inspired by a number of widely-pub licized faculty dismissals from various 
institutions around the country, which were viewed by many as motivated by political or personal 
conflicts rather than impartial assessment of teaching and research performance, a group of 
professors at Johns Hopkins University issued a call in 1913 for the formation of an association 
for university faculty members. The proposal to form this association underscored two key tasks, 
both aimed at enhancing professional control of work: development of a set of principles and 
po licies that colleges and universities should follow in terminating faculty employment, and 
development of procedures that would enable the association to undertake impartial investigations 
into alleged violations of academic freedom. The principles that were ultimately hammered out 
provided academic professionals with a key role in organizational employment decisions, and an 
avenue for normatively sanctioning organizations that failed to adhere to them. 
The development of tenure systems was pursued in a number of position papers published 
by the AAUP in 1915, 1925, and 1940. The classic articulation of the key elements of tenure 
systems, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, defined tenure as an 
“arrangement under which faculty appointments…are continuous until retirement…subject to 
dismissal for adequate cause or unavoidable termination on account of financial exigency or 
change of institut ional program,” and presented it as a means of attracting talented individuals to 
the profession as well as protecting professional freedom of speech (Commission on Academic 
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Tenure, 1973: 2). (See Carmichael [1988] for a rather different economic rationale for tenure 
systems.) 
Notably absent from the Statement were any overt references, or even reasonably clear 
indirect allusions, to non-tenure-track, limited-term appo intments. The first official recognition of 
such appointments appeared in the Association’s Recommended Institutional Regulations on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure, issued in 1956, known as Regulation 1b: 
With the exception of special appointments clearly limited to a brief association with the 
institution, and reappointment of retired faculty members on special conditions, all full-
time appointments to the rank of instructor or higher are of two kinds: (1) probationary 
appointments; and (2) appointments with continuous tenure (AAUP, 1978, p. 270, italics 
added). 
Although clearly intended to discourage non-tenure-track appointments, this regulation points out 
an inherent ambiguity in the institution of tenure as proposed by the AAUP – what proportion of 
the faculty of an institut ion could legitimately hold such “special appo intments.” 
However, the general economic affluence in the nation in the post-World War II years, 
combined with unprecedented government efforts to increase access to college education through 
student subsidies and a growing market for higher education created by the post-War baby boom, 
created a resource-rich environment in which universities had little reason to deviate from the 
professionally-prescribed practice of tenure-track employment. This context also undoubtedly 
enhanced the effectiveness of the AAUP’s efforts to ensure adherence through public 
investigation and censure of institut ions charged with not following these principles (AAUP, 
1965). 
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In the decades following 1940, tenure became firmly institutionalized among higher 
education organizations, as evinced by several characteristics of contemporary tenure systems 
(Sine, 2000): taken-for-grantedness (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) , symbolic value (Selznick, 
1957), and prevalence (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). A key indicator of its taken-for-granted status is 
the notable absence of publicly accepted alternative systems for faculty employment. Although a 
few proposals for new employment arrangements for faculty have been offered (e.g., Chait & 
Ford, 1982), these have received little attention or support either within or outside the academic 
profession. Moreover, tenure systems have, from the beginning, symbolized commitment to an 
important professional value, academic freedom. They have become defined as being not merely 
one way of protecting academic freedom but as the way, and rejection of tenure systems is 
interpreted by many as a rejection of academic freedom itself (Finkin, 1996). Finally, the 
prevalence of tenure systems among colleges and universities also indicates a high degree of 
institut ionalization. National surveys conduc ted by the National Center for Education Statistics in 
the early 1990s indicated that virtually all four-year institutions had such a tenure system in place 
(National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 1996).3 This prevalence is, in some respects, 
self-sustaining. As Chait and Ford (1982) note, “Put most simply, as long as most colleges and 
universities offer tenure, most colleges and universities will offer tenure. With respect to faculty 
recruitment and institutional reputation, the perceived risks of deviating from accepted practices 
are greater than most institutions are prepared to assume” (1982, p.10, italics in original). 
Thus, today tenure systems are considered a standard, defining element of higher 
education (Cotter, 1996; Iffland, 1998), essential for maintaining the qua lity of a “first rate 
university” (Brewster, 1972). As Mallon observes (2001, p. 6), “Because tenure is the preferred 
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system of faculty employment and a hallmark characteristic of higher education . . . a college 
shifting from tenure to contracts moves away from the professional norms of higher education.” 
Declining Implementation of Tenure Systems 
Despite the highly institutionalized status of tenure systems, their implementation began to 
decline noticeably in the mid-1970s, in tandem with shifts in the environment of higher education 
organizations. During this period, both the number of college-age students and government funds 
for higher education began to shrink (Frances, 1983; Froomkin, 1990), prompting many colleges 
and universities to search for ways to reduce costs. As in many private, for-profit organizations 
during this time period, personnel costs often became the focus of such searches. In this 
environment, the ambiguities surrounding the implementation of tenure systems (i.e., what is an 
acceptable level of “special appointments”) became salient to many college and university 
administrators, and the proportion of faculty employed in full-time, tenure-track positions crept 
slowly downward throughout the 1970s, leveled off in the 1980s, then began to inch down once 
again in the mid-1990s. 
During this time, the AAUP continued to advocate strongly for the use of tenure systems 
for new faculty appointments and attacked the legitimacy of non-tenure-track appointments in a 
series of reports issued throughout the 1980s and 1990s (AAUP, 1986, 1992; see also Kasper, 
1986). For example, a conference report issued in the late 1990s (AAUP, 1998: 57) offered an 
ominous catalog of negative consequences for both teaching and research associated with the use 
of non-tenure-track faculty, concluding: “…reliance on part-time and adjunct, non-tenure-track 
faculty degrades the environment in which both full- and part-time faculty work, diminishes 
faculty professional development, and denies many students adequate access to quality 
instruc tion.” 
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Despite these efforts, the implementation of tenure systems – indicated by the average 
proportion of faculty employed through them – has declined markedly in the last four decades. 
The proportion of faculty in non-standard positions was 22% in 1970; by 2007, this had risen to 
nearly half of all faculty appointments (NCES, 2007). Thus, though tenure systems are still 
considered a standard, core element of higher education, universities and colleges have 
increasingly used fixed-term and often part-time arrangements in staffing faculty po sitions. These 
appo intments are typically made and terminated with only limited faculty input (Tolbert, 1998) . 
Although clearly noticeable in the long run, the glacial rate at which this change occurred (on 
average, the decline was about one percent a year) made it much less visible on an annual basis. 
The very slow pace is consistent with the structure’s highly institutionalized status; in the absence 
of significant exogenous shocks, such structures are likely to be relatively inertial (Zucker, 1977). 
Moreover, the decline has been far from uniform: colleges and universities evince striking 
variation in the use of tenure systems. This variation is clearly reflected in our sample of four-year 
colleges and universities, described below. For example, in 1995, the proportion of faculty in 
tenured or tenure-track positions ranged from 2 percent to 100 percent across organizations. 
This historical sketch of tenure systems indicates that while these structures are still 
institutionalized today, i.e., are normatively accepted as a standard component of higher education 
organizations, their regular use for faculty employment varies considerably across organizations, 
and overall, is declining. How to explain such variations and trends in implementation? Below 
we consider recent work that is relevant to answering these questions, and in this context, 
propose a number of hypotheses concerning predictors of implementation. 
INSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITY AND DECOUPLING 
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Recent analyses provide insights into how decisions concerning the adoption and 
implementation of institut ionalized struc tur es might be differentially related to orga nizational 
characteristics (Edelman, 1990; Sutton & Dobbin, 1996; Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). A key 
premise of this work is that, even when a structure is highly institutionalized and organizations 
face strong pressures to adopt it, there is often ambiguity concerning exactly how and/or when it 
should be implemented. Such ambiguities often necessitate making independent, local decisions 
about implementation, often on a case-by-case basis. For example, companies may adopt parental 
leave policies because such arrangements have become defined as an important element of family-
friendly corpo rations. But the conditions governing the use of such policies are rarely elaborated; 
hence, supervisors must decide whether the policy applies to a given employee, under a given set 
of circumstances, or not (see Powell & Mainiero, 1999). Thus, while decisions to ado pt 
institutionalized structures are usually made at a single point in time, decisions about 
implementing these structures are often made repeatedly over time (Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, 
2005); in a context of ambiguity, this is apt to result in variations in the level of implementation 
both across organizations at a single time po int, and within a given organization across multiple 
time po ints. 
A number of recent studies have begun to investigate factors that influence the 
implementation of institut ionalized structures (Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 2001; Westphal, Gulati & 
Shortell, 1997), but none have examined institutions that are strongly endorsed by professional 
associations or ones that have become “sedimented” – long-established and well-accepted among 
a set of organizations (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). We argue that under these conditions, ceteris 
paribus, institutionalized structures are likely to be implemented completely (or nearly so) 
because they are, by definition, accepted as legitimate (Zucker, 1977, 1991). However, when 
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there are noticeable costs associated with implementation, ambiguities about whether and to what 
extent to implement formal structures are apt to become more salient to decision-makers, and as 
resource scarcity increases, they are likely to become more conservative in making such decisions 
(Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). 
On the other hand, insofar as the institution continues to be actively promoted by some set 
of agents, the failure to implement formal structures may entail costs for the organization as well, 
in particular, the po tential loss of legitimacy and withdrawal of support (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Oliver, 1997). Professional associations and 
allied constituents not only pressure organizations to formally ado pt institut ionalized structures, 
but may pressure them to put such structures into practice after adoption (Sauder & Espeland, 
2009; Scott et al., 2000); thus, ties to supporters of professionally-endorsed institutions may act 
as countervailing pressures to those created by resource constraints (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
In addition to these forces, there may be endo genous limits to implementation of 
pr ofessional institut ions. As normative rules, institut ions restrict choices and thus may limit 
organizations’ ability to adapt to both internally- and externally-generated changes. Like resource 
constraints, institutional arrangements that significantly curtail organizational flexibility and 
adaptability are likely to make ambiguities concerning “reasonable” implementation salient to 
decision-makers, particularly under conditions of organizational and environmental uncertainty. 
Under these circumstances, we expect that organizations with high levels of implementation will 
be apt to engage in decoupling to avoid further reductions in flexibility. Below, we elaborate on 
the impact of these three forces – resource constraints, the influence of allied constituents, and 
endogenous limitations – on the use of tenure systems. 
Resource Constraints 
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Although specific estimates of the relative costs of implementing tenure systems are hard 
to find, there is general agreement that employing faculty through a tenure system entails greater 
costs than employing non-tenure-track faculty (Baldwin & Chronister, 2001; Clotfelter, 2002; 
Gappa & Leslie, 1993). The latter are often employed on contracts that extend only for a single 
academic term (versus a typical three-year contract for untenured faculty, or the indefinite 
contract of tenured faculty). Moreover, many non-tenure-track faculty receive few or no 
benefits, and they are often compensated at half or less of the per-course rate of tenure-track 
faculty (AAUP, 1998: 55).4 The more constrained and less secure the financial resources of an 
organization are, the more conscious decision-makers are likely to be of these relative costs, and 
the more weight they are apt to be given in deciding whether to make a faculty appointment 
tenure-track. (See Gorman, 1999 and Sherer & Lee, 2002, for a similar argument about the use 
of non-partner, permanent employees in law firms.) 
We examine a number of characteristics of colleges and universities as indicators of the 
level of resource constraints they face, including total revenues, prestige, endowment size, and 
tuition dependence. Higher average levels of revenues serve as a general indicator of slack 
resources in the present, while prestige has been shown generally to have a positive effect on 
organizations’ ability to attract resources (Podolny, 1993; Sandefur, 2001). Likewise, a larger 
endowment provides a buffer against long-term variability in resource flows.5 Also in this 
context, we examine percent of revenues derived from student tuition. We treat this as an 
indicator of resource constraints because students and parents represent a constituency that 
usually cares a great deal about tuition costs, one that is likely to place more value on relatively 
lower costs than on small increments in legitimacy or status that may be gained by adhering to 
professional standards. Moreover, the link between the implementation of tenure systems and the 
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status of the institution may be particularly opaque to this group. Thus, the greater the share of 
revenues derived from this constituency, the greater the pressure organizations face to minimize 
operational costs (Leslie et al., 1982). Using the proportion of faculty employed on tenure-track 
lines as a measure of the degree to which a university has implemented its tenure system, then, we 
expect that: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The higher the per-student revenues in a college or university, the 
higher the level of implementation of its tenure system. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the prestige of a college or university, the higher the level 
of implementation of its tenure system. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The larger the endowment of a college or university, the higher the 
level of implementation of its tenure system. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The lower the dependence on tuition by a college or university, the 
higher the level of implementation of its tenure system. 
Allied Constituents 
Accounts of the history of specific professions draw attention to the importance of 
alliances with related groups and organizations – schools, accrediting agencies, producers of 
related products, and so forth – for professionalization projects. Such alliances often offer mutual 
benefits. Thus, schools work with professions in order to offer new programs for students 
(Larson, 1977), publishers interact with professionals to gain new markets for textbooks and 
other publications (David, 2011), and accreditation and consumer protection organizations draw 
on professions in formulating and legitimating their tasks (Rao, 1998) . Professional allies not only 
accept but often even work to promote the institutions that a profession creates, and offer the 
threat of sanctions against organizations that fail to conform. In this context, we consider the 
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influence of a number of constituents that are expected to support the implementation of tenure 
systems: research-granting agencies, accreditation agencies, and faculty unions. 
Generally, agencies that provide funding for research care not only about the quality of the 
faculty applying for the grant but also about the reputation of the institution. The latter depends, 
in part, on the institut ion’s conformity to professional norms (Greenwood et al., 2002). Most 
research agencies require a principal investigator to be a tenure-track faculty member in order to 
receive funding. As one administrator from the office of research and sponsored programs for a 
private medical school said, “most research oriented grants from NIH require that the principal 
investigator be a senior investigator and most senior investigators tend to be tenured faculty 
members” (personal interview, May, 2004). In addition, high-status members of the professoriate 
often serve as evaluators of grant applications, and these individuals are likely to be closely 
attuned to the professional standing of different universities. Moreover, faculty who are 
successful in acquiring grants are also apt to be conscious of the professional standing of an 
organization and less likely to accept employment in ones that deviate noticeably from these 
norms. The link between use of tenure systems, professional standing, and research funding is 
evidenced by the substantial drop in research funding experienced by schools that have sought to 
reduce the use of tenure systems (see Miller, 1999). Thus, institutions that are more research-
oriented are more likely to make use of tenure systems for faculty employment.6 
Accrediting agencies represent another constituency that may affect the use of tenure 
systems. Many agencies include conditions of faculty employment as part of their standards for 
certification (see Ruef & Scott, 1998) and promote the appointment of full-time, research-
oriented faculty. For example, until recently, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of 
Business (AACSB) required that at least 75 percent of the faculty be “full time” (AACSB, 2001). 
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Although most accreditation standards do not explicitly make reference to “tenure track faculty” 
nor set specific employment targets (the AASCB was the only agency we found that specified a 
numerical target), the phrasing of these standards at least implicitly promotes the use of tenure-
track faculty. Therefore, we expect that the more accreditations an organization has successfully 
sough t, the more likely it is to face pressure to implement its tenure system. 
Faculty unions also may influence decisions regarding the implementation of tenure 
systems. The classic distinction between unions and professional associations, revolving around 
engagement in collective bargaining, has broken down in the last few decades, as a growing 
number of associations, including the National Educational Association, the American Nursing 
Association and even the American Medical Association, have formed units to engage in formal 
nego tiations for their members in organized workplaces. Consequently, the assumption of an 
antithetical relation between unionization and professionalization has also lost its tenability 
(Rabban, 1991). However, unions of professionals are not always directly affiliated with a 
professional association, and they do not always support associations’ stances on particular issues. 
Although faculty unions have exhibited some ambivalence about their relation to non-tenure-track 
faculty (since these are a logical target group for unionization), they have generally chosen to 
advocate for greater implementation of tenure systems (Leslie et al., 1982). Thus, we contend 
that the presence of a faculty union, which has the ability to monitor hiring practices easily and to 
exercise power within the organization, will also increase the extent to which tenure systems are 
implemented. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The stronger the research orientation of a college or university, the 
higher the level of implementation of its tenure system. 
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Hypothesis 6 (H6): The greater the number of accreditations held by a college or 
university, the higher the level of implementation of its tenure system. 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): A college or university with a faculty union will have a higher level of 
implementation of its tenure system than one that does not. 
Endogenous Limits 
Although ensuring control of faculty employment by members of the profession was of 
paramount concern to the creators of the institution of tenure, the wording of the AAUP’s 1940 
Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, accepting “dismissal for adequate cause or 
unavoidable termination on account of financial exigency or change of institutional program,” 
sugge sts recognition of po ssible problems that its limits on flexibility could create (Commission 
on Academic Tenure in Higher Education, 1973: 2). In the context of overall growth in higher 
educ ation organizations and official age limits on employment, this po tential inflexibility seemed 
relatively unproblematic for most organizations. However, the general contraction of resources 
in higher education in the late 1970s, in conjunction with the passage of the Age Discrimination 
Act in the mid-1980s , effectively eliminating age-based retirement rules, threw this inflexibility 
into sharp relief (Ashenfelter & Card, 2002). Although the AAUP’s prescribed policies imposed 
no explicit restrictions on the continued collegial review of faculty members’ performance after 
tenure – a po tential professionally-directed basis for dismissal – it was not until the 1990s that 
serious discussion of post-tenure review began (Edwards, 1997; Tierney, 1997). 
In consequence, in recent decades higher education organizations have increasingly faced 
problems of re-allocating personnel resources between declining and growing enrollment areas. 
Facing similar problems in the 1980s, private sector organizations made “flexibility” a watchword 
in employment relations, one that was usually synonymous with the increased use of non-standard 
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workers – those employed on a part-time and/or on an explicit, limited-term basis (Kalleberg, 
2009). Although the evidence is mixed, some work suggests that the use of non-standard 
employees was particularly likely to occur in organizations with unions, another employment 
institut ion explicitly aimed at limiting the facile dismissal of employees (Uzzi & Barsness, 1998). 
Extrapo lating from this, it seems plausible that limiting implementation of tenure systems by 
employing more non-tenure-track faculty could be a likely response to inflexibility associated with 
having a relatively high proportion of tenure-track faculty that have been awarded indefinite 
tenure. Insofar as this resulted in new or vacated positions being filled by non-tenured-track 
faculty, over time, this would result in a smaller propo rtion of the total faculty being employed 
through the tenure track. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): The fewer tenure-track faculty who have been awarded indefinite 
tenure in a college or university, the higher the level of implementation of its tenure 
system. 
DATA AND ANALYTIC PROCEDURES 
The analyses presented here are based on five panels of data, collected through the 
Integrated Post-secondary Education Data Surveys (IPEDS), conducted bi-annually by the 
National Center for Education Statistics. We used data covering a ten-year span, 1989 through 
1997, for a randomly chosen sample of higher education organizations that grant baccalaureate 
and higher-level degrees. The time period of the study was dictated by the availability of 
comparable data on staffing and finances. Our initial sample consisted of 611 organizations, but 
we eliminated those for which data were unavailable for two or more years of our study, reducing 
our sample to 587. To ensure that all institutions in our study had a formal tenure system, 
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additional 54 cases were dropped from the analysis because they reported no tenure-track faculty 
in any year of this study.7 The sample includes a variety of types of colleges and universities: 
dates of institutional founding range from 1636 to 1986, and sizes vary considerably, from a small 
private college offering a bachelor’s degree to its 64 students to a large public institution with 
61,500 students offering a full range of educational degrees. 
It should be noted that our analyses are predicated on the assumption that even when 
decisions about tenure-track or non-tenure-track appointments are formally made at the subunit 
level (e.g., by deans of individual colleges within an institution), they are heavily shaped by the 
levels of resource scarcity, inter-organizational relations, and other conditions that characterize 
the larger organization of which the subunit is part. Based on interviews with college deans and 
administrators in three institutions, we conclude that central administrations of colleges and 
universities shape faculty hiring in several ways. First, the allocation of faculty appointments is 
sometimes directly under control of the university administration. For example, a dean in a 
business school at a small private college indicated that aut horization for filling both tenure-and 
non-tenure-track positions was up to the president and provost, an arrangement that appears to be 
common in smaller institut ions. Second, central administrations often determine subunits’ budget 
allocations, and this strongly influences hiring decisions, even when the number of tenure-track 
and non-tenure-track faculty positions is not set directly. A dean of a small college within a large 
private university observed that budgetary uncertainties occasionally made him “hold” vacant 
tenure-track lines; under these conditions, he often approved non-tenure track faculty hires to 
cover teaching loads. He also noted that these appointments were sometimes extended even 
when resource constraints eased. Third, even in subunits that are relatively economically 
independent, unit heads are influenced by central administration. The dean of a business school at 
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a large pub lic institut ion repo rted that historically, all tenure-track faculty hires had been 
authorized by the administration. Although they had recently been given control over all faculty 
appointments, they were aware that the administration continued to monitor both tenure- and 
non-tenure-track hires. In line with this, a high level administrator at a large private university 
reported that college deans were conscious of the “need” not to make “too many” non-tenure-
track appointments. Thus, even when faculty appointments are technically left to the discretion of 
subunit administrators, these decisions are clearly influenced by the overall context of the 
universities within which the subunits operate. In this context, it’s also worth noting that our 
organization-level focus is similar to that of the National Center for Education Statistics and the 
AAUP, both of which monitor employment practices at the university level; moreover, when the 
AAUP sanctions an entity, it is at the organizational level (AAUP, 2006). 
Measures 
Dependent variable 
We measured implementation of tenure systems as the proportion of faculty in a university that 
hold tenure-track positions, that is, faculty either tenured or who are on track to be considered for 
tenure (see Westphal & Zajac, 2001, for a similar approach). Information on the number of 
faculty on or off the tenure track in each university was available from the IPEDS Fall Staff data 
file.8 Institutions vary considerably in the proportion of tenure-track faculty who actually receive 
tenure, and it could be argued that this represents a form of limited implementation of tenure 
systems. However, decisions not to grant particular faculty tenure are not inconsistent with the 
use of tenure systems as currently defined by the AAUP. Thus, we focus on the number of faculty 
employed on tenure-track lines rather than the number of faculty that actually receive tenure. 
Although we dropped all institutions out of our initial sample that reported no tenure-track faculty 
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during the entire study period to ensure that all institutions in our study had a formal tenure 
system, our dependent variable can have a minimum value of “0” (see Table 1) because some 
institut ions reported no tenure-track faculty in a particular year within the time period of our 
study. 
Primary independent variables 
Resource constraints. Financial data were taken from the IPEDS Finance data file, based 
on surveys sent to each institution, requesting information on both revenues and expenditures. 
Information on revenues includes not only total revenues, but the amount of revenue derived 
from various sources, including state and federal government support, tuition and fees, 
independent operations, and so forth. We used the selectivity ratings of colleges and universities 
from Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges as an indicator of prestige, collecting data from each 
year published, 1988 through 1996. Because our sample contained a wide range of colleges and 
universities, many were not included in some of the common ranking systems of colleges and 
universities (e.g., Gourman Reports), while other rankings, such as those by the National 
Research Council, are published only once a decade. Barron’s classifies higher education 
organizations into one of nine ordinal categories, ranging from most competitive to non-
competitive; we coded the former as 9 and the latter as 1. Although this source covers a wide 
array of organizations, it is less likely to include very small schools that offer degrees in a limited 
number of areas. In these cases, we assigned a rating of “0.” 
To obtain an overall measure of resource levels, we used total revenues from all sources, 
divided by overall enrollment to produce a standardized, per-student measure. The size of an 
organization’s endowment was measured as the market value of endowment assets at the 
beginning of the instructional year. Because the impact of this on decision-makers’ perceptions of 
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financial security is apt to depend on the scale of an organization’s budget, we standardized this 
by dividing it by the total revenues of the organization. Dependence on student tuition was 
measured as the percentage of total revenue derived from tuition and fees. 
Allied constituents. The research orientation of an organization was measured by the 
proportion of total annual expenditures devoted to “activities specifically organized to produce 
research outcomes,” according to instructions provided to IPEDS respondents. We did not 
measure research orientation by research-grant revenue because IPEDS lumps all types of grants 
(e.g., grants for training programs, community service projects, etc.) together in a single measure. 
Thus, we believe the expenditure-based measure is the best indicator of research orientation. The 
influence of accrediting agencies was measured by the total number of accreditations reported in 
the IPEDS Institutional Characteristics data file: like revenues, this was standardized by dividing it 
by the total number of students. We used a dichotomous measure of faculty unionization, coded 
“1” if an organization had a collective bargaining contract covering faculty. 
Endogenous limits. To measure progressive inflexibility in staffing created by tenure 
systems, we took the number of faculty who had been awarded tenure and divided this by the total 
number of tenure-track faculty (both tenured and untenured).9 
Control variables 
In addition, we include d a number of control variables in our model. Organizational size, 
growth, and complexity have been shown to have pervasive effects on organizational structure. 
Thus, we included measures of size, operationalized as the total student enrollment, and of 
growth, measured as change in enrollment over a one-year period. Complexity was measured as 
the number of degree-granting programs (i.e., a set of specialized courses required for a specific 
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degree) in an institut ion. We employed the natural log of these variables to correct for skew in 
their distributions. Data on these variables were taken from IPEDS Fall Enrollment Surveys. 
Professionally-oriented fields often offer courses taught by practitioners who are typically 
not employed on tenure-track lines. Therefore, organizations whose curriculum or enrollments 
are more concentrated in those fields are likely to have a larger proportion of such faculty. To 
control for the effect of such variation in disciplinary compo sition, we included a measure of the 
proportion of all degrees awarded annually in fields designated as “first-professional.” These 
include degrees in health sciences, law, business, and graduate theology. Medical schools are 
especially likely to employ practitioners on a part-time basis to teach (Leslie et al., 1982); hence, 
we used a dummy variable to indicate the presence of an affiliated medical school. 
Because public sector organizations have been shown to be more responsive to 
institutional pressure (Casile & Davis-Blake, 2002; Edelman, 1990), we created a dummy variable 
for sector, with pub lic institut ions being assigned the value “1.” Similarly, since research indicates 
that older organizations are more inertial (Haveman, 1992), older universities might be expected 
to maintain adherence to institutional prescriptions to use their tenure systems; therefore, we 
included a measure of age, the number of years since founding (so that older schools have higher 
values). 
To control for the potential influences of regional variations in economic conditions, 
legislation, density of higher educ ation institut ions and so forth, we include d a dummy variable for 
each state, excluding Alaska. Finally, to control for general temporal changes in the use of non-
tenure track faculty dur ing this time period, we used a linear time trend variable representing the 
number of years since our study period began (where 1989=1). 
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Analysis 
We employed a cross-sectional time-series tobit model with rando m effects (Woolridge , 
2000). Tobit models are appropriate when the dependent variable is a percentage measure 
because the distribution is bounded on the lower end by 0 and on the upper end by 1 (Long & 
Freeze, 1997). We do not use fixed effects models because, as far as we can tell, there is no 
consistent estimator for fixed effects in tobit models, which makes it impo ssible to use the within 
transformation to remove unobserved effects (Greene, 2002; Baltagi, 1988). In addition, most 
fixed effects models do not allow for the inclusion of measures that are time-invariant, and some 
of our key predictor and control variables (e.g., presence of a faculty union, public control) are of 
this type. 
All independent and control variables are lagged by one year in the analysis to enhance 
causal explanation. Moreover, in order to assuage concerns of reverse causality we conducted 
two additional analyses. First, we increased the lag time between the dependent and independent 
variables substantially; we predicted the proportion of faculty employed in tenure track positions 
in 1997 using the independent variables measured in 1988. Insofar as the independent variables 
serve as significant predictors of the dependent variable at this much later time po int, this provides 
evidence in support of the causal direction we posit. The results of this analysis were 
substantively the same as those reported in Table 2. Second, we ran a model that included a 
lagged measure of the dependent variable along with the other predictor variables. By controlling 
for the value of the dependent variable in the prior panel, the model becomes one that essentially 
predicts changes in the dependent variable from the independent variables. Moreover, the lagged 
dependent variable serves as a good proxy for all omitted variables and thus provides a strong test 
of the effects of the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2000). Despite the collinearity 
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introduced in such a model (and resulting large standard errors, which increase the hurdle for 
reaching statistical significance), our results from this analysis were largely consistent with those 
shown in Table 2. 10 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. Several variables, such as our measures of size 
and public control, have high correlations with other variables in the model. In these cases, we 
tested for multicollinearity by calculating variance inflation factors for each independent variable. 
All variance inflation factors were less than 5 and most were less than 3, indicating an acceptable 
level of multicollinearity (Chatterjee & Price, 1991; STATA, 1999, p. 203). 
-Insert Table 1 about here-
Table 2 presents the results of our main analysis. Five models are shown: the first 
includes only control variables, the second adds measures of resource constraints (H1, H2, H3, 
H4), the third adds indicators of the influence of allied constituents (H5, H6, H7), the fourth adds 
our measure of endo genous limits (H8), and the fifth includes all independent variables. We focus 
our discussion primarily on the results of Model 5. 
-Insert Table 2 about here-
The impact of the control variables is generally consistent across each of the models. As 
expected, organizations that award a relatively large proportion of degrees in fields that are 
professionally oriented are less apt to use tenure systems for faculty appointments; this also is true 
of those that have an affiliated medical school. Independent of these effects, our measures of 
public control and age show significant positive effects on the proportion of faculty employed 
through tenure systems. More complex organizations (those offering a wider array of degree 
programs) are also significantly more likely to have a relatively large propo rtion of faculty in 
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tenure-track positions in four of the five models; the measure loses significance, however, when 
all independent variables are included in the equation (Model 5). The coefficient for the size 
measure is negative in most models, though it is significant in only three. In general, it appears 
that larger schools are likely to have a smaller proportion of faculty employed on tenure-track 
lines. The negative effect of the time trend measure indicates that the use of tenure systems for 
faculty employment significantly declined across the organizations in our sample dur ing the 
observation period, in line with our earlier description of the history of tenure systems. 
Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, the significant, positive effects of overall revenues 
and prestige indicate that, when resource constraints are lower, colleges and universities are more 
inclined to comply with professional prescript ions, using their tenure systems to a greater extent 
than those with more constrained resources. Endowment has a significant, positive effect, as 
po sited in Hypo thesis 3, but this effect disappears when other predictor variables are included in 
the model. Although the coefficients of the measure of tuition dependence are negative across all 
models, they do not attain significance; thus, we find no support for Hypothesis 4. 
Turning to the effects of ties to constituents who are likely to press for greater 
implementation of tenure systems, we see that neither research orientation nor the presence of a 
faculty union have a significant impact on the use of such systems. In results not shown, we 
found that the presence of a union had a significant positive impact on organizations’ use of their 
tenure system when the public sector measure was omitted from the equation. In the wake of the 
1980 Supreme Court decision on unionization at Yeshiva University, almost all faculty unions 
have been in public sector organizations, making it difficult to disentangle union and sector effects. 
We tried including an interaction term for union and sector to tease out separate union effects; the 
coefficient for the variable was positive but non-significant. Thus, our results do not support 
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Hypo theses 5 or 7. However, the number of professional accreditations is po sitive and significant, 
providing support for Hypothesis 6. 
Finally, our results provide strong support for Hypothesis 8. Colleges and universities 
with a high proportion of faculty who are “tenured-in” are much more likely to make use of non-
standard faculty work arrangements than those with lower proportions. Based on t-statistics, this 
variable and the time trend measure are the strongest (negative) predictors of the proportion of 
faculty employed on tenure-track lines. 
We also examined potential interaction and mediating relationships in a number of other 
models (not shown; please write first author for tables). For example, we considered a possible 
interaction effect between research orientation and the presence of a medical school (with the idea 
that the impact of a medical school on the increased use of non-tenure-track faculty might be 
lessened by a strong research focus); the coefficient for the interaction term was non-significant, 
however. To explore whether an organization’s prestige might mediate the effects of other 
variables (e.g., possible indirect effects of resource constraints operating partly through prestige), 
we ran models that excluded prestige. The measure of model fit dropped significantly when we 
excluded prestige, and none of the coefficients of other predictor variables changed noticeably, 
with the exception of endowments, which became stronger. Thus, we concluded that the direct 
effects of the predictor variables were robust. Finally, since many of our variables are ratio 
measures, we ran additional analyses with non-ratio measures and obtained the same substantive 
results as those reported in Table 2. 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis suggests that, when making decisions that involve implementation of tenure 
systems, colleges and universities respond to both resource constraints and concerns about 
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reactions of constituents allied with the professional association. The findings that universities 
with higher levels of revenues, greater prestige and relatively large endowments are more likely to 
use tenure systems for faculty employment than those with limited resources support our 
theoretical arguments that ambiguities about the “appropriate” level of implementation of 
institutionalized structures are more salient when pressures to contain costs are higher. Because 
tenure systems are still strongly institut ionalized, perhaps it is not surprising that in the absence of 
such pressures organizations are apt to conform to the professional association’s prescriptions for 
faculty employment. 
Even in the presence of resource constraints, pressures from supporters of 
institut ionalized structures, particularly constituents that control other kinds of valued resources, 
can also exert an independent and potentially countervailing influence on organizational decision-
making. But in our analysis, only our indicator of ties to accrediting agencies showed significant 
effects; measures of ties to other constituents expected to support use of tenure systems showed 
negligible influence: neither research orientation nor the presence of a faculty union was 
significant. This is in striking contrast to other research that has found strong effects of 
constituent ties on the implementation of newly-adopted policies and practices (Fiss & Zajac, 
2004; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). It may be that once a structure is firmly institutionalized, 
advocates are less attentive to implementation issues, particularly when changes in implementation 
occur very slowly, as has been typical for tenure systems. We suspect that ties to these 
constituents might have a stronger impact on decisions to eliminate tenure systems altogether, or 
to reduc e implementation very markedly at a given po int in time than on small changes resulting 
from day-to-day decisions concerning implementation. 
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Net of the effects of both resource constraints and relations with allied constituencies, our 
results suggest that having a larger proportion of faculty with tenure is associated with decreasing 
implementation of tenure systems. Insofar as faculty who have been awarded tenure do not leave 
(either through moves to other organizations or through retirement), tenure systems can limit 
organizations’ ability to adapt to environmental changes and current organizational needs. Like 
resource constraints, the lack of flexibility is apt to heighten awareness of the ambiguities of 
professionally-prescribed practice. In ironic consequence, organizations respond to this lack of 
flexibility by relying less on tenure systems for additional faculty employment. The “tenuring-in” 
effect thus suggests a counterintuitive consequence of the institutionalization of tenure systems: 
although designed to protect the professional status of academics, over time, they may be 
contribut ing to increasing differentiation and stratification within the pr ofession. 
It is important to emphasize that our arguments do not necessarily imply that 
organizational decision-makers limit implementation of tenure systems as a self-consciously 
deceptive practice, nor that decisions to make non-tenure-track appointments signal decision-
makers’ rejection of the legitimacy of tenure systems. Ambiguity surrounding the conditions 
under which tenure systems should be employed for faculty hires makes it possible to view non-
tenure-track appointments as still part of a good-faith effort to comply with professionally-
prescribed tenure practices. The influence of the professional association’s ambiguous stance 
regarding the use of non-tenure-track faculty on administrators’ decisions is suggested by a study 
conducted by an AAUP committee in the late 1970s which found that many higher education 
institut ions formally limited the number of times that a non-tenure-track faculty member’s 
contract could be renewed. As the committee noted, this state of affairs is consistent with the 
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letter, if not the spirit, of Regulation 1b, which recommended that non-tenure-track appointments 
be limited to a “brief association” (AAUP, 1986, 1992). 
Overall, a variety of organizational characteristics appeared to exert a strong influence on 
implementation, including sector location and organizational age, along with the economic and 
constituent relation measures just discussed. Thus, although characteristics of organizations may 
become less impo rtant in determining adoption as structures become progressively 
institutionalized, as previous work has suggested (e.g., Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), it appears that 
they continue to exert an influence on implementation decisions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our study contributes to existing theory and research in a number of ways. First, it 
provides impo rtant insights into the conditions that make organizations likely to comply with the 
efforts of professional associations to define “appropriate” work arrangements and conditions for 
their individua l members. As noted at the out set, while professions sometimes rely on law or 
other coercive means to obtain such compliance, more often than not, they rely on the force of 
normative influence. Thus, for example, one of the products of the 2009 American Medical 
Association meetings was a Delegates Memo outlining “principles for a sustainable and successful 
hospitalist program.” “Hospitalist” refers to a relatively new area of medical specialization, one 
that involves employment of on-staff physicians by hospitals for a contractually-specified length of 
time. The Delegates Memo offered a series of employment recommendations to hospitals on 
proper employment arrangements, ranging from the creation of a “hospitalist advisory committee” 
of the medical staff, to the management of proper compensation systems, to the purchasing of 
software produc ts to help with billing, communication, etc.11 Such recommendations are, as 
institutional theorists have acknowledged, a potentially important force in shaping organizational 
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structure. But to date, relatively little work has considered either the environmental or internal 
organizational conditions that affect organizations’ receptivity to such pressure from professional 
groups. Thus, our research on the implementation of tenure systems begins to identify some of 
these key conditions. 
In addition, this research sheds light on conditions affecting the employment of 
nonstandard workers in professional work settings. While past work on nonstandard workers in 
other contexts has linked the use of such employees to pressures for organizational efficiency 
(Larson & Ong, 1994; Uzzi & Barsness, 1998), much less attention has been given to how 
institutional factors may shape their use (though see Gorman, 1999; Sherer & Lee, 2002). 
Because professions are, by definition, occupationally-based work groups that are capable of 
exerting directed, active influence on workplace institutions, the role of interest and agency in 
maintaining and altering existing workplace institut ions is often more visible when professional 
groups are involved (see also Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). It is for this reason that professional 
occupations provide a particularly interesting context for studying contemporary workplace 
changes such as the increased use of temporary and contingent employees (Kalleberg et al., 2009; 
Segal, 1996). 
In part, our findings are consistent with other studies conducted in non-professional 
contexts, suggesting that economic constraints have a strong effect on organizations’ use of 
nonstandard work arrangements (Uzzi & Barsness, 1998). Despite strong, articulated objections 
by organized representatives of the profession, economic pressures lead to the increased use of 
non-tenure-track faculty. However, our results suggest that closer ties to professional allies may 
counter this. It is possible that similar processes could operate in non-professional settings (e.g., 
the employment practices of organizations that receive awards from human resource management 
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associations might be similarly affected), though this has not yet been explored, to the best of our 
knowledge. In addition, research on nonstandard workers suggests some possibilities for research 
on the way in which the use of nonstandard employees affects professionals. For example, since 
tenure systems provide job security for some faculty (those who have received tenure) but not for 
others (untenured, tenure-track faculty), it would be of interest to explore whether the presence of 
non-standard workers affects the professional commitment and attitudes of faculty in ways that 
have been found in studies of standard, non-professional employees (Banerjee, Tolbert, & 
DiCiccio, 2010; Davis-Blake, Broschak, & George, 2003). 
Finally, this study contribut es to work on organizational institut ions. Because tenure 
systems represent a mature institution, one that has been widely adopted and taken for granted for 
several decades, our research on the implementation of such systems contributes to the 
understanding of institut ions’ lifecycle patterns. While early studies of institutional processes 
focused largely on the adoption and diffusion of formal structures (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999), more 
recent work has begun to give greater attention to the genesis of institutionalized structures, and 
to the other end of the process, their abandonment (Dacin et al., 2002). However, both earlier 
and more recent research streams have generally overlooked intermediate stages of institutional 
processes, the maintenance and/or decline of institutions. One way to explore this is to examine 
the implementation of structures. In a review of analyses drawing on institutional theory, Scott 
(2001: 173) emphasized the importance of questioning the assumption that institutionalized 
structures are always decoupled and suggested the need for empirical research examining “when 
and under what conditions do organizations adopt requisite structures but then fail to carry out 
the associated activities?” This question is addressed in our research. 
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Extant work examining implementation (e.g., Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Westphal & Zajac, 
2001) has focused largely on structures at a relatively early stage of institut ionalization. 
Comparing the findings of our research with these studies illuminates how the effects of 
organizational characteristics may vary at different stages of an institution’s lifecycle. In 
particular, our findings indicate that implementation is much less influenced by institut ional 
advocates once it has become well-established, compared with newly-adopted structures. On the 
other hand, our findings, in combination with work on relatively young institutions (e.g., Westphal 
& Zajac, 2001), suggest that economic concerns continue to play a role in implementation 
de cisions through out an institut ion’s lifecycle. 
Our focus on implementation also provides a bridge between the literatures on institutional 
diffusion and organizational change. Early work in institut ional theory, sugge sting that 
institutionalized structures are normally decoupled from actual practice, implied that 
institutionalization processes produce little real change in organizations, apart from altering 
formal structure. In contrast, our theoretical framework suggests that the extent of decoupling is 
highly variable across organizations and is shaped by a variety of factors. Hence, whether the 
ado pt ion of institut ionalized structures is likely to be implemented and result in real, substantive 
changes in organizations depends on a combination of factors: institutional definitions (the degree 
of ambiguity surrounding “appropriate” implementation), organizational characteristics (variations 
in resource constraints, prestige, social sector), and institutional characteristics (lifecycle stage). 
In this context, it is tempting to speculate on the future of tenure as an institution. Despite 
the efforts of the AAUP to secure adherence by colleges and universities to the norm of using 
tenure systems for faculty employment, the use of such systems is slowly, but clearly, declining 
(Baldwin & Chronister, 2001; Levine, 1997). As noted previously, this decline is part of an 
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increasing differentiation and stratification within the profession, processes that are also visible in 
other contemporary professions, including the central ones of medicine and law (D’Aunno, 
Alexander, & Laughlin, 1996; Freidson, 1994; Gorman, 1999; Sherer & Lee, 2002). The impact 
of such changes on the collective identity of occupational members, and the ability of professional 
associations to maintain a public face as a representative of shared occupational interests remains 
to be seen. 
At present, employment arrangements for non-tenure-track faculty are far from 
standardized, although there are an increasing number of proposals concerning the development 
of standards and practices for employing such faculty (e.g., AAUP, 1998; Gappa & Leslie, 1993). 
Thus, we may be witnessing the emergence of an alternative institut ion for faculty employment, 
producing a two-tiered system within academic organizations. While this could be viewed as a 
strategy for preserving the institution of tenure by limiting its application, it is not a strategy that 
has been explicitly suppo rted by the professional association. Moreover, the survival of such a 
dual-system will require much greater formalization of conditions of the appropriate use of one or 
the other employment systems, as well as clearer specification of the division of labor between the 
two types of faculty. Whether two separate systems can co-exist in the long run, or whether this 
would further increase the use of non-tenure-track employment at the expense of tenure-track, 
thus ultimately resulting in the elimination of the cur rent institut ion of tenur e, is ope n to que stion 
(see DiMaggio, 1988; Leblebici et al., 1991; Zucker, 1987, 1988). More generally, whether and 
under what conditions two-tiered employment institut ions will be stable or competitive are issues 
that merit further research. 
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Table 1 Correlations and summary statistics 
1 Percent of tenure-track faculty 
2 No. full time students 
3 Student growth 
4 Complexity 
5 Professional-oriented degree 
6 Medical school 
7 Public institution 
8 Time trend 
9 Age 
10 Revenue per student 
11 Prestige 
Total endowment 12 income/revenue 
13 Tuition dependency 
14 Research orientation 
Professional accreditations per 15 
student 
16 Faculty union 
17 Percent of tenured-in faculty 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
0.16 
-0.01 0.12 
0.20 0.76 0.08 
-0.13 0.20 0.01 0.10 
0.00 0.36 0.08 0.30 0.33 
0.20 0.57 0.11 0.32 -0.13 0.16 
-0.09 0.02 -0.17 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
0.12 0.03 -0.04 0.11 0.04 0.13 -0.13 0.06 
0.09 -0.10 -0.07 0.03 0.19 0.40 -0.29 0.23 0.24 
0.14 0.19 0.00 0.30 0.03 0.06 -0.13 0.02 0.27 0.34 
0.06 -0.27 -0.07 -0.12 -0.05 -0.12 -0.39 -0.02 0.29 0.32 0.28 
-0.24 -0.35 -0.13 -0.26 0.02 -0.39 -0.65 0.03 0.06 -0.25 0.09 0.07 
0.08 0.45 0.06 0.32 0.16 0.50 0.29 0.02 0.09 0.38 0.23 -0.08 -0.44 
-0.10 -0.53 -0.06 -0.42 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 0.23 -0.02 0.17 -0.22 0.10 0.05 -0.15 
0.10 0.29 -0.01 0.18 -0.09 -0.01 0.38 0.01 -0.09 -0.16 -0.01 -0.18 -0.20 0.07 -0.16 
-0.14 0.25 -0.01 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.10 -0.14 0.15 -0.11 0.20 
17 
0.59 8.02 0.12 4.63 0.06 0.08 0.40 5.00 103.52 9.38 4.23 0.04 -1.04 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.68 
0.24 1.16 0.78 0.73 0.10 0.27 0.49 2.83 47.15 0.65 1.85 0.05 0.65 0.06 0.00 0.36 0.16 
0 3.91 -8.95 0 0 0 0 1 4 7.31 0 0 -4.62 0 0 0 0 
1 11.03 8.98 6.40 0.70 1 1 9 362 13.44 9 0.36 -0.09 0.46 0.07 1 1 
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Table 2 Predictors of Proportion of Faculty in Tenure-Track Positions 
Variables/Models 
Control Variables 
No. full time students 
Student growth 
Complexity 
Professional-oriented degree 
Medical school 
Public institution 
Time trend 
Age 
Resource constraints 
Revenue per student 
Prestige 
Total endowment income/revenue 
Tuition dependency 
Allied constituents 
Research orientation 
Professional accreditations 
Faculty union 
Endogenous limits 
Percent of tenur ed-in faculty 
Constant 
Chi Squared Statistic 
Log likelihood 
1 
-0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.13+ 
(0.08) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.19) 
222.4 
850.7 
2 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.17* 
(0.08) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.10** 
(0.03) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.01** 
(0.00) 
0.45* 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.43 
(0.27) 
204.8 
729.9 
3 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.13+ 
(0.08) 
-0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
6.11*** 
(1.37) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.20) 
246.6 
861.0 
4 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.17* 
(0.07) 
-0.08* 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
-0.21*** 
(0.03) 
0.37* 
(0.18) 
273.4 
994.6 
5 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.20* 
(0.08) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.16) 
6.00** 
(1.97) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.27*** 
(0.03) 
-0.28 
(0.26) 
281.7 
839.2 
Standard errors in parentheses 
State dummies are not shown 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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END NOTES 
1
 Although Meyer and Rowan discuss decoupling, they do not explicitly define what they mean by this 
term. However, recent work has used it to refer to limited implementation of a formally adopted structure – 
e.g., a written policy or set of rules (Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 2001; Scott, 2001; Fiss & Zajac, 2004). 
Following this line of research, we define adoption of a structure as official, formal recognition of a policy 
or practice by an organization, i.e., having it “on the books.” By implementation, on the other hand, we 
refer to the extent to which the structure is used as part of everyday operations. In contrast to adoption, 
which we conceptualize as a dichotomous variable, we view implementation as a continuous variable: the 
more often and more widely a formally-adopted policy or procedure is used by an organization, the greater 
its level of implementation. 
2
 The following historical description draws heavily on the analysis offered by Metzger (1973) . 
3
 We searched extensively for systematic data on dates of adoption of tenure systems by colleges and 
universities, but were not able to locate this information. 
4Although it is possible, at least in theory, for universities to avoid some of the costs of tenure systems by 
never awarding tenure to tenure-track faculty, since untenured tenure-track faculty often command higher 
salaries and more benefits than non-tenure-track faculty, they are relatively more costly. Moreover, non-
tenure-track appointments are usually shorter and do not normally convey any implicit long-term 
employment. Whether the awarding of tenure is becoming less common, along with increased use of non-
tenur e-track lines, is unclear. 
5
 Final college and university budgets are designed to make revenues equate to expenditures; thus we 
cannot use the ratio of revenues to expenditures as an index. In this context, we argue that having higher 
average revenues provides a reasonable index of the level of expenditures an organization can afford. 
6
 We recognize that the current relationship between hiring faculty on tenure-track lines and obtaining 
research funding is likely to be characterized by reciprocal causality: while schools with a stronger 
research orientation are more likely to conform to professional norms by hiring faculty into tenure-track 
positions, it is also the case that schools with a greater proportion of tenure-track faculty are likely to have 
higher levels of research activities. We argue, however, that it is unlikely that organizations typically 
committed to hiring faculty in tenure-track lines first and then developed an organizational identity as a 
research institution; the reverse ordering seems more plausible and is consistent with many historical 
accounts of the development of research universities (e.g., Bruba cher & Rudy, 1997). 
7
 The majority of schools that reported no tenure track faculty in any panel of our study were affiliated 
with conservative religious groups, and it is likely that most of these do not have formal tenure systems. As 
one respondent at such an institution explained, “(ours is an institution) strongly committed to humility and 
egalitarianism and thus has no rank or tenure” (personal communication, October 30, 2010) . A number of 
others were specialized professional institutions, such as Otis College of Art and Design; these sorts of 
institutions also often do not have tenure systems. 
8
 According to IPEDS instructions to respondents, tenure-track is defined as “positions that lead to 
consideration for tenure” and tenure as “status of a personnel position, or a person occupying a 
position…with respect to the permanence of the position.” 
9
 This variable was assigned a value of “0” when the denominator (the total number of tenure-track faculty) 
is zero. 
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10
 While including a lagged dependent variable controls for endogeneity due to omitted variable bias, this 
practice creates its own set of problems (Wooldridge, 2000) and may result in estimator bias (Halaby, 
2004). For this reason, we provide this additional analysis simply as a robustness test of our original 
results. Please contact first author for tables. 
11
 www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/21/a09delegatesmemo.pdf 
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